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Reflections on the Development and Prospects of the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas: Does It Relate to the European Experience? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
What is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) really about? What kind of 
integration does it consist of? What motivates Western Hemisphere countries to move in 
such a direction? We need to reflect on the meaning and significance of the FTAA. At 
this writing, as we know, it is not entirely clear when there will be one. 
 
It is perhaps easier to say what the FTAA is not about. Most obviously, its wellspring 
is not analogous to the Schuman Declaration, the political origin of the European Union 
announced on May 9, 1950.   That document said quite plainly that the pooling of coal 
and steel between the two main European powers would be done to prevent any future 
war between them:   
 
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war 
between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially 
impossible.  
 
There have been wars between states in the Western Hemisphere during the past two 
centuries.  However, they have been limited or minor when compared to the European 
conflicts of the Twentieth Century. World Wars have not rampaged through the region, 
and no one has suggested integration as a necessary way to insure international peace.  
 
Yet, the idea of integration has been around in the Western Hemisphere since the 
independence of these republics. Their initiatives have been motivated by other sets of 
mutual interests. The FTAA is only a recent event in that chain. Let me mention just a 
brief selection of the integration efforts that have transpired. Essentially, using very 
disparate threads, a web of relationships has been woven over a long period, converging 
into the FTAA concept. 
 
In 1826, Simon Bolívar inspired the Congress of Panama
1, an effort to weld together 
the newly free states of northern Latin America. He invited the U.S. president, John 
Quincy Adams, who, though not especially an admirer of Latin Americans, was eager 
that his government attend the sessions. A reluctant Congress, however, held up the 
approval of the two U.S. representatives and then delayed the funding of their trip until it 
was too late for them to get there before it had ended.  Does that sound familiar? 
 
The Congress of Panama was attended by four American states--Mexico, Central 
America, Gran Colombia, and Peru. The "Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and   
Confederation" drawn up at that congress would have bound all parties to mutual defense 
                                                           
1 Though he did not personally attend it.   2
and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Only Colombia ratified it, however, and   
Bolivar’s dream failed so completely that he lamented before his death that to support 
revolutions was “to plough in the sea.” 
 
A subsequent step toward integration was taken in 1889, when the First International 
Conference of American States, commonly known as the Pan American Conference, 
convened in Washington, DC.  Its driving force was James G. Blaine, the American 
secretary of state. Its result, an initiative "for the prompt collection and distribution of 
commercial information” established the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics 
in Washington, with a secretariat.  Some 18 Western Hemisphere nations, including the 
United States, joined it.  In 1910, the Commercial Bureau became the Pan American 
Union, and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie donated $5 million to construct a permanent 
headquarters, the beautiful building in Washington, which today is the headquarters of 
the Organization of American States. 
 
Other periods of United States-Latin American relations, while signifying interaction 
between these parts of the Hemisphere, can hardly be associated with integration. I refer 
to War of 1898 and Cuba, the Panama Canal, the period known as “dollar diplomacy,” 
and the various interventions by the United States in Central America, the Caribbean and 
several times in Mexico.
2 
 
Franklin Roosevelt created a positive relationship with Latin America though his 
embracing the “non-intervention” principle, abolition of the Platt Amendment, and an 
ambitious program of educational and cultural interchange. It accounted for strong 
support from most of Latin America during World War II and set the stage for the Rio 
Treaty (1947) and the Organization of American States (1948) after the war. They were, 
for the United States, essentially security arrangements based on the Cold War. Those 
Latin Americans who hoped that they might be the precursor of a Marshall Plan were 
bitterly disappointed. 
President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil proposed an ambitious integration scheme 
called “Operation Pan America” in the late 1950’s which linked economic and 
development components to security considerations.  It stated “The more rapid 
development of Latin America's economic strength will result in a growing sense of 
vitality and will enable it to increase its contribution to the defense of the West.” 
3  The 
establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank in December 1959 is a result of 
his efforts. The Hemisphere-wide development theme was advocated powerfully to 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower by his brother, Milton Eisenhower, who prepared a 
report on the region. 
 
                                                           
2 A highly readable account of these years is in Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle  (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2000). 
3 Council of the Organization of American States, Special Committee to Study the Formulation of New Measures 
for Economic Cooperation, Volume L Report and Documents, First Meeting, Washington, D.C., November 17-
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During the Eisenhower years, in fact, plans were being drawn up to implement some 
of Kubitschek’s and Milton Eisenhower’s ideas. Nonetheless, it fell to the new John F.  
Kennedy Administration in 1961 to propose the Alliance for Progress. The Cuban 
revolution obviously gave it a Cold War rationale, as well, similar to that of the Marshall 
Plan; there must be no more Cubas. At the same time, it was clearly an integrative 
advance, and President Kennedy cited Operation Pan America in launching it. The 
Alliance’s vision was bold: 
 
And if we are successful, if our effort is bold enough and determined enough, then 
the close of this decade will mark the beginning of a new era in the American 
experience. The living standards of every American family will be on the rise, basic 
education will be available to all, hunger will be a forgotten experience, the need for 
massive outside help will have passed, most nations will have entered a period of 
self-sustaining growth, and, although there will be still much to do, every American 
Republic will be the master of its own revolution and its own hope and progress.
4 
 
By the late 1960’s, the Alliance had nearly run out of steam, so to speak, but one last 
effort aimed at a true integration project. The Organization of American States held a 
Meeting of American Chiefs of State in Punta del Este, Uruguay from April 12-14, 1967, 
which President Lyndon B. Johnson attended. Its centerpiece was none other than a 
genuine common market: 
 
The Latin American Common Market will be based on the improvement 
of the two existing systems: the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). The two 
systems will initiate simultaneously a process of convergence by stages of 
cooperation, closer ties, and integration, taking into account the interest of 
the Latin American countries not yet associated with these systems, in 
order to provide their access to one of them. 
5 
 
The United States promised to assist this process with substantial aid. But President 
Johnson was increasingly bogged down in Vietnam, and the largely authoritarian 
countries of Latin America were not at any stage of readiness for a common market. 
Their economic policies became increasingly centered on protectionism, import-
substitution industrialization, state-owned enterprise, and borrowing as preferable to 
foreign direct investment. 
 
In 1969, President Richard Nixon asked Nelson Rockefeller to prepare a complete 
report on the state of U.S.-Latin American Relations and the region’s political, economic, 
financial and social conditions.
6 Arguing for more U.S. attention to the region, it foresaw 
many of the issues which would later come to the forefront, including the debt crisis of 
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5 OAS Official Records, OEA/ser.C.IX.1 (English). 
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the 1980’s. But the Vietnam War had not ended, and the report, along with attention to 
Latin America, was laid aside. 
 
The preferred economic policies ran their course with the debt crisis of the 1980’s, 
properly termed a “lost decade,” until they were replaced by neo-liberal reforms, 
beginning in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Economic failure also helped effect the 
restoration of democratic governments.
7 Moreover, the end of the Cold War enabled the 
United States to take a different view of the Hemisphere, among other things taking away 
the attractiveness of supporting anti-communist dictatorships.  
 
Large steps forward occurred during the administration of President George H.W. 
Bush during 1990.  The significant economic policy transformations in Mexico under the 
de la Madrid and Salinas de Gortari governments made the start of the NAFTA 
negotiations possible (building on the already existing FTA with Canada.) The debt 
workout using Brady bonds would put the debt crisis into the background. On June 27, 
1990, President Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, resting on the 
tripod of debt workout (linked to environment initiatives), stimulation of new investment, 
and trade initiatives reaching beyond NAFTA. Bush’s vision was one of a democratic 
free trade region reaching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. 
 
Part of the Bush motivation may have been the U.S. economic interest in a world that 
might be dividing up into trading blocs, if the Uruguay Round of the GATT were 
unsuccessful. Under such circumstances, the United States might not have a trading bloc 
to call its own in which it enjoyed such high market share. 
 
But NAFTA negotiations were not the only game going on in the Hemisphere. 
Bilateral and regional integration efforts were breaking out all over. On March 26, 1991 
the Southern Cone countries of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay signed the 
Treaty of Asunción, establishing the MERCOSUR common market. Not just a free trade 
agreement, it was to be a European-style common market. The agreement provided: 
 
The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, which 
shall be in place by 31 December 1994 and shall be called the 
"common market of the southern cone" (MERCOSUR).  
 
This common market shall involve:  
 
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production 
between countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs 
duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any 
other equivalent measures;  
 
                                                           
7 Other factors also obviously brought about the change. In Argentina, the defeat of the military government by the 
United Kingdom in the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1992 brought down the regime. By the end of the decade a 
referendum was finally held in Chile which ended the Pinochet dictatorship.   5
The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a 
common trade policy in relation to third States or groups of States, 
and the co-ordination of positions in regional and international 
economic and commercial forums;  
 
The co-ordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the 
States Parties in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal 
and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, 
transport and communications and any other areas that may be agreed 
upon, in order to ensure proper competition between the States Parties.
8 
 
Despite a deep division among Democrats, President Bill Clinton completed and 
signed the NAFTA and then waged the political fight in the Congress for its approval, 
which finally came in late 1993. It was a true Armageddon between those two great 
macro-tendencies in U.S. politics, the globalist-free traders and the protectionists.  (The 
following year U.S. adhesion to the WTO was fought the same way, though less 
acrimoniously.) An interesting speculation is whether the NAFTA legislation could have 
passed if it were not for an expensive public relations campaign put on by the Mexican 
Embassy in Washington, aimed at the U.S. public. 
 
In December 1993 Vice-President Al Gore was in Mexico City, mending fences after 
the rough atmospherics of the U.S. Congressional debate. There he made the surprise 
announcement that President Clinton would invite all of the Hemisphere’s heads of state 
and government to a meeting in the United States in 1994. This, of course, ultimately 
turned out to be the Summit of the America, in Miami, in December 1994. All countries 
in the Western Hemisphere were there except Cuba, and they were represented by freely-
elected leaders. 
 
The FTAA turned out to be the centerpiece of the Summit, though, strangely, that was 
only decided upon in October. Well, not so strangely, there were members of the Clinton 
Administration still licking their political wounds over NAFTA and determined that there 
would be “no more NAFTAS.” But, consensus prevailed at the Summit, and the long 
process was begun toward a FTAA. To keep momentum going, the first Trade Ministerial 
meeting was set for the following spring in Denver, to begin the FTAA’s implementation. 
 
There were several obvious holes in the FTAA web from the outset which would 
have to be filled in.  
 
First, it was plain that there was no commonly-held design or blueprint. In general, 
NAFTA countries assumed that the FTAA would be a sort of NAFTA rolling southward 
until it reached Tierra del Fuego.
9 Meanwhile, in Brasilia, other thoughts ran strong: 
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9 Immediately after the closing ceremonies of the Summit, the three NAFTA heads of state announced that Chile 
would be the next NAFTA member. Although Chile would proceed to sign FTA’s with Mexico and Canada, its 
agreement with the United States could not be reached until 2003, when “fast-track” authority was restored by the U.S. 
Congress.   6
perhaps the deeping of MERCOSUR to become a kind of SAFTA to negotiate more 
evenly with the North. 
 
Second, there was no entity around which to build the FTAA; nothing which would 
correspond to the European institutions created from the beginning of the 1950’s. This 
was deliberate; countries of the Americas are highly nationalistic and would not 
countenance the erosion of sovereignty which has taken place in Europe. The idea of 
some creeping supranational authority, accepted early on in Europe, was and still is 
anathema on this side of the Atlantic. 
 
Third, despite the bold declarations to the contrary, there was no successful way to 
bring the private sector and civil society directly into the process.  When the Trade 
Ministerial meetings began, to be sure there were Business Forums seeking private sector 
input, and finally a civil society forum was held along with the Miami meeting in 
December 2003. Their input has not been direct, however. 
 
Fourth, from the beginning there has been some doubt about the U.S. commitment, 
without which there can be no FTAA. In 1995 the “fast-track” authority ran out which 
allowed up-or-down voting in the Congress for trade agreements. It was only restored 
(under the new name Trade Promotion Authority) in the George W. Bush Administration 
in 2002 (but runs out again in June 2005). Although the U.S.-Chile FTA passed the 
Congress and has had one good year of positive accomplishment, it is not clear at this 
writing whether the DR-CAFTA regional FTA will be approved. 
Another problem for the FTAA, of course, is the issue of the smaller economies (over 
half of the FTAA countries) and whether they can survive without more special 
arrangements than now seem to be offered. After all, the special aid offered to new 
European Common Market countries in the past (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal) has 
been essential to their integration. 
 
But after two more full Summits (Santiago, 1998 and Québec, 2001, two special 
summits (Santa Cruz on sustainable development in 1996 and Monterrey on security and 
democracy in 2004), and a projected one (Mar del Plata, November 2005, which 
President Bush will attend) the process continues. Never mind that it did not make its 
completion date of January 2005. That was an arbitrary and speculative goal when chosen 
at the Miami Summit. 
 
The emphasis today in South America seems to be movement toward regional 
integration, as does the movement by the United States and its closer-in neighbors. 
Meanwhile, the idea of a North American Community, elucidated at this conference by 
Dr. Robert A. Pastor
10, may be the closest thing at this end of the Hemisphere to the 
beginnings of European-style integration, based, as it is, on the reality of economic 
relationships. 
11 The recent meeting in Crawford, Texas between the three NAFTA 
country leaders underscored that vision, even though it produced little results. 
                                                           
10  See his book, Toward a North American Community  (Washington, Inst. of Int’l. Economics, 2001). 
11 Recent recommendations go quite far in this respect. The Independent Task Force on the Future of North 
America under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales and   7
How far and how fast will the Hemispheric relationships progress, of which the 
FTAA is a paradigm rather than a tangible reality? There are, of course, external 
relationships to be taken into account: The European Union has FTA’s with Mexico and 
Chile; Chile and Mexico are members of APEC. MERCOSUR and the EU have held 
talks, though the most recent meeting of negotiators this month ended on a dismal note.
12 
 
As for the United States, as Latin Americans are well aware, its policy toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean has long been characterized by sporadic periods of attention 
punctuated by longer periods of inattention.  In the view of many, the United States can 
and should do better in the region in pursuit of its own national interests.
13 This country’s 
leadership now focuses on homeland security, the war on terrorism, and the problem of 
failing states around the world. The outcome (and exit plan) in Iraq is far from clear. 
  
Moises Naim, editor of Foreign Policy magazine, said that despite President Bush’s 
presence at the Monterrey summit last year, which pleased Latin American leaders, 
“…the reality is that Latin America, usually seen as the US backyard, has become 
Atlantis, the lost continent.”  
 
As in many situations, it is useful to look at U.S. relationships before and after the 
date of September 11, 2001, which changed the United States’ relationship with the 
world to such an extent. President George W. Bush began his administration in 2001 with 
a great deal of obvious interest in Latin America. His first foreign visit was with 
President Vicente Fox of Mexico, and the two discussed a special migration accord 
(strongly desired by Mexico but which became a non-starter). President Bush committed 
to achieving the FTAA on schedule in 2005 and an “early harvest” of business facilitation 
measures. At the Quebec Summit of the Americas, shortly after his inauguration, he 
endorsed a “democracy clause” for the FTAA, which, was  encompassed in the 
“Democratic Charter” signed at Lima  on September 11, 2001 by Secretary Powell. It 
makes democracy the only accepted norm in the Western Hemisphere, a policy which 
President Bush had given strong endorsement. In this important respect, the FTAA 
process coincides with the norms and standards of the EU. 
 
After September 11, 2001 Latin America showed its solidarity with the United States 
by adopting an Organization of American States (OAS) resolution proposed by Brazil on 
September 21 to invoke the Rio Treaty, as an attack on a member state which called for 
action by all members. Nevertheless, it was clear that other priorities, obviously the war 
against al- Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, dominated the scene. The 
special relationship with Mexico faded in importance, and there was some doubt as to 
whether the Congress would give Trade Promotion Authority to the President in order to 
stay on course with the FTAA. The general world economic downturn and especially that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Canadian Council of Chief Executives even recommends a common external tariff; see “Creating a North American 
Community.” New York: Council on Foreign Relations 2005. 
12  “Hopes fade for early EU trade deal with MERCOSUR,” Financial Times  (US ed), March 29, 2005 
13  See “Agenda for the Americas,” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue, 2005. This report argues for a far 
stronger Latin American- U.S.partnership.   8
of the United States affected Latin America profoundly, cutting its already low growth 
rate to almost zero and negative in some countries. 
Beginning early in 2002¸ however, the picture improved. On January 16, 2002, 
President Bush addressed the OAS, again committing this country to the FTAA and 
announcing his intent to pursue a free trade agreement with Central America. U.S. Trade 
Representative  Zoellick presented a strong pro-trade testimony to the Senate on February 
7. In March 2002 President Bush visited Mexico, El Salvador and Peru, and he began the 
final push for Trade Promotion Authority and other measures of a trade bill approved by 
the Congress in August. In Monterey, Mexico, last March 14, 2003, President Bush 
announced the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account, which, by 2006, adds 50 
percent to the core development assistance funding of 2002. From 2006 onwards, $5 
billion per year would be put into that account.  In the meanwhile, however, the 
Administration also showed a protectionist face by adopting special tariffs on steel and 
by supporting a $180 billion farm subsidy bill. These measures again raised doubts about 
U.S. credibility in free trade.   
 
From the beginning of this administration, it has seemed that President Bush is the 
one person in his administration who has had the highest interest in Latin America, and 
that this interest is personal. His closest advisors, such as Vice President Cheney, 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Rice and even Secretary of 
State Powell, were not previously known to have any special interest in the Western 
Hemisphere.   
 
On a concluding note, it is evident that the United States still enjoys a great deal of 
goodwill in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Iraq crisis, and then the subsequent 
war and present occupation under violent circumstances have provoked very strong anti-
U.S. attitudes in many parts of the world.  Latin America and the Caribbean have 
constituted a region perhaps somewhat less affected by that phenomenon than in other 
places. Their countries have their own pressing matters to attend to, and they need help. It 
is also a part of the world with which the United States shares a great many goals and 
aspirations. It should simply find ways to expand its attention span to give the Western 
Hemisphere the consistent focus in its policy mix that is compatible with broader, long-
term national interests. Public opinion polls (Zogby, Latinobarómetro) reflect highly 
unfavorable attitudes in Latin America toward Bush Administration policies, as much as 
87 percent among opinion leaders. These probably signify, as much as anything else, a 
sense of frustration from the relative low priority given to the region by Washington 
under present circumstances. 
 
Shared values and common interests still come to the fore, however.  Latin American 
response to this year’s Haiti crisis has been impressive. Chile sent troops within 36 hours 
of President Aristide’s departure, to join the U.S., Canadian and French forces in Haiti. It 
since sent a second increment on March 9. Brazil is now in charge of the international 
peacekeeping contingent. It is an impressive demonstration of shared responsibilities in 
the Hemisphere. 
   9
How will the relationship play out in the future?  Latin America continues to hope for 
a greater role of partnership with the United States. At the same time, it is in a mode of 
deepening its economic ties with the rest of the world, especially Europe and Asia. 
On another positive note, Chile, Brazil and Argentina have benefited from the rise of 
the Chinese economy. Although the region cannot compete with China in manufactured 
goods, China has become an excellent customer for agricultural products, especially soy, 
livestock, and mineral products such as iron ore. China is now Chile’s third-largest 
trading partner. President Hu spent 12 days on a tour of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries last year. Among other things, he promised increased investment. Chinese 
purchases of agricultural and mineral products are partially responsible for the upturn in 
the growth rates in several Latin American countries.  
 
China is on the move in other areas as well. Because of dogged U.S. opposition to the 
International Criminal Court, eleven Latin American countries which once sent military 
officers for training and education to the United States (about 700-800 officers) are now 
unable to do so under a U.S. law because of their countries’ refusal to sign “Article 98” 
agreements (i.e., agreeing never to turn over a U.S. person to the ICC). According to U.S. 
military sources, many of them are now going to China at the invitation of the Peoples’ 
Liberation Army. 
 
As the EU enters its bold new step of enlargement, it is all too clear that nothing 
similar will happen any time soon in the Western Hemisphere. The European willingness 
to experiment with political institutions and to trade elements of national sovereignty for 
closer integration, remain a distant model for this part of the world. 
 
 